U.S.S. TANG (SS 306)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
3 September, 1944
The Commanding Officer
: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
: The Commander Submarine Division 141
The Commander Submarine Squadron 14
The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet
The Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
U.S.S. TANG (SS 306), Report of Fourth War Patrol.
(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track chart. (ComSubPac only)
1. Enclosure (A), covering the fourth war patrol of this
conducted in Japanese Empire waters during the period
July 1944 to 3 September. 1944, is forwarded herewith.
R. H. O'KANE
Returned from third war patrol July fourteenth. The refit
SubDiv 62 and Submarine Base, Midway, completed on the
is considered our finest to date. Conducted
training and departed July thirty-first.
July 31 (+12) - August 7 (-9)
Underway for areas four and five at two engine speed.
Conducted usual training dives and fire control drills,
and enjoyed yachting weather.
August 8 (-9)
Dived a half hour to avoid a bomber sighted at about
Dived an hour for another bomber about ten miles
Sighted MIKURA SHIMA in the NAMPO SHOTO, but because
of known radar installations nearby, proceeded to INAMBA
SHIMA, a small pinnacle, for checking our SJ.
August 9 (-9)
Conducted submerged patrol near INAMBA SHIMA in the
vicinity of numerous plotted contacts. Continuous
periodic sweeps at forty feet finally located what
might have been smoke beyond ZENNI SU, so on surfacing
proceeded to the northwest to investigate. No contact was
made, but as all the surrounding areas were vacant, closed
the coast in the bight west of OMAE SAKI for submerged
patrol at dawn.
August 10 (-9)
Dived six miles from the beach and continued closing
the coast. A few minutes later sighted single mast and
superstructure of an apparent patrol boat which continued
its sweep down the coast.
Sighted a large engine-aft ship against the beach,
escorted by three bombers. We were already on his beam
six thousand yards away, so except for closing the traffic
route, our approach served only to impress our OOD's with
the necessity of sticking one's eyeballs on the beach to
pick out the shipping.
ATTACK NO. 1
Within an hour of securing from battle stations for
this first ship, and having avoided another patrol by
continuing in, sighted an old type loaded tanker right
against the beach headed for OMAE SAKI. As four bombers
were the only escorts, took a sounding to find we were
still in forty fathoms. A standard speed approach closed
him to 1200 yards where with echo and stadimeter ranges
three Mk 23 torpedoes spread his length by constant
bearings, 100 starboard track. speed 8.5, set at eight
feet, gyros near zero. No hits. No explosions on the
beach three thousand yards away. Two minutes after
firing, the tanker, alerted, reversed course away, so
commenced evasion, thoroughly expecting bombs or several
depth charges. We rolled on the bottom at eighty feet
during our turn to evade, but reached deep water and
commenced periscope patrol.
Very distant counter attack commenced.
surfaced north of DAIO SAKI, and staying clear of its
252 MC radar, proceeded down the 100 fathom curve past
MIKI SAKI searching for any night shipping.
August 11 (-9)
Having doubled back to MIKI SAKI, dived three miles
west of the point, then closed intercept any morning
When visibility was just becoming good through the
periscope, sighted smoke against the beach and the bow
wake of an escort. Before we could reach an approach
course, the escort and a large engine-aft freighter ducked
around MIKI SAKI and into KADA WAN, thence down the coast.
Patrol activity increased steadily with one pinger
generally in sight, an inshore patrol proceeding back and
forth a thousand yards off MIKI SAKI, and a motor boat
resembling a landing barge with six lookouts making a
nuisance of itself.
After ducking for a modern looking gunboat loaded
with depth charges, heard extremely loud pinging coming up
the coast. The A/S vessel was not as big as his ping, but
coming straight to MIKI SAKI, then changing course to
seaward, he forced us off the fifty fathom curve as we
kept our stern to him. His method became apparent when a
tanker came out of KADA WAN and ducked around MIKI SAKI
with the TANG hopelessly out of position for attack.
With changing tide, fogging periscopes nearly ruined
the rest of our day for we were spotted by the motor boat
when longer exposures became necessary. He was extremely
difficult to shake, but on sighting smoke, a half hour run
at standard speed into OKASE WAN left him out on the
80 fathom curve. This put us in about forty fathoms of
water, on the route followed by the tanker, and on their
most probable track.
ATTACKS NO.2 and 3
The smoke, which had been in two columns, developed into
two mast-funnel-mast split superstructure freighters in
column. They were escorted well to seaward by the gunboat
previously sighted, and by a smaller escort on the other
bow. During the remainder of the approach, the leading
ship was identified (EC) as of the BIYO MARU class, page
220 ONI 208-J (rev'd), and the second about two thirds her
size as similar (EU) to the AKASI MARU, page 230. Both
ships were heavily loaded.
When in position 1700 yards on the convoy's beam,
just prior to firing a final set-up, sound showed our
gunboat coming in fast about a thousand yards away,
evidently warned by the motor boat of our presence.
Fired three Mk 23 torpedoes at the leading freighter,
range 1800, 110 starboard track, depth setting 6 feet,
spread 150 ft of the targets length by constant bearings,
followed by a similar spread at the second freighter on an
80 starboard track. Took a quick low power sweep to
observe the gunboat filling the field boiling past our
stern, evidently having misjudged our course and giving
the wrong lead. Reassured, swung quickly to the leading
target in time to see the first torpedo hit right in the
middle, evidently in his Scotch Boilers, for he
disintegrated with the explosion.
On our way deep, timed our fourth and fifth torpedoes
to hit the second freighter, followed by a tooth-shaking
depth charge attack. As the gunboat's screws on our port
bow showed his intent to turn us toward shallow water,
make a full speed dash, assured by single ping soundings
taken with each barrage. Even at this speed, the
twisting, scrunching, breaking-up noises were loud in the
direction of the targets. After twenty-two close ones,
the depth charges drew aft and we were able to return to
in thirty-eight minutes. The gunboat was now about
4000 yards on our quarter, the other escort at the scene
of the attacks apparently picking up survivors, and one
plane was circling the area. Nothing else was in sight.
Continued to seaward at five knots and surfaced at
dark with depth charging still progressing and the area
astern of us being swept by searchlights.
Headed for INAMBA SHIMA at 18 knots.
August 12 (-9)
Commenced submerged patrol between INAMBA SHIMA and
MIKURA SHIMA back on our schedule.
Maneuvered to avoid a patrol boat and proceeded south
of MIKURA SHIMA as the Kuroshio was setting us on the
Again the enemy had succeeded in chasing us from a
likely spot, for after twenty-four depth charges and
continuous planes and patrols, sighted distant smoke in
the direction of our dawn position.
As our attempts to maintain, and then to regain
contact with the smoke had been futile, and even a six
knot enemy ship would reach TOKYO BAY ahead of us,
proceeded to the NOJIMA SAKI-INUBO SAKI area to intercept
Moved into KATSUURA WAN three miles from the beach to
insure radar contact on any shipping.
August 13 (-9)
As no contact was made and the visibility dropped to
zero from wood smoke rolling from the beach, withdrew for
submerged patrol at dawn.
Sighted distant smoke to the southeast headed for
NOJIMA SAKI and TOKYO. Four bombers and a patrol boat
prevented a surface dash to get on his track, and our
twelve mile approach fell short by six thousand yards of
attaining a firing position.
After surfacing, took one more turn up the 100 fathom
curve to INUBO SAKI before proceeding south to the TORI
SHIMA area of the southern islands.
August 14 (-9)
When 40 miles east of HACHIJO SHIMA, dived to avoid
detection by a patrol yacht. His maneuvering during the
day prevented our usual surfacing for high periscope
searches, so kept in sight for a 4" target if better
shipping did not show up. Numerous planes indicated that
he may have spotted us too.
surfaced to regain contact but dived in twenty
minutes on the approach of a plane.
GUN ATTACK NO. 1
Surfaced to maintain contact and check all guns, then
to seven thousand yards and commenced firing. The
enemy was tenacious and wary, twisting and turning and
closing the range at every opportunity, and though he
replied only with apparent 20 mm. machine guns, he was on
in deflection and not far short with a range of 4500
yards, forcing us to haul out frequently.
It was impossible with his movements and the 4" rate
of fire to stay on for more than one or two hits, and only
eight sure hits were observed. These were beauts,
however, demolishing his deck house aft and exploding in
his side and upper works.
With eighty-eight rounds expended and the enemy still
under control, perhaps from central station, proceeded to
the south for patrol on the following day.
August 15 (-9)
Conducted submerged high periscope patrol east of TORI
SHIMA surfacing periodically for high periscope searches.
August 16 (-9)
Patrolled on the surface, searching with seven lookouts
and high periscope.
Dived on sighting MAVIS, which dropped one depth
charge thirty minutes later.
Continued surface patrol.
August 17 (-9)
Patrolled as on previous day.
Dived for an hour to avoid detection by a distant
dived again for a bomber.
August 18 (-9)
Patrolled as on previous day.
Dived an hour for a distant aircraft, then proceeded
west at three engine speed to reach KANTORI SAKI by the
August 19 (-9)
En route KANTORI SAKI for close in patrol.
Submerged thirty miles from the coast and continued
to close submerged.
On surfacing closed the coast just short of KANTORI
SAKI to intercept any night shipping. The numerous
sampans and row of lights previously reported are still in
evidence, but nothing interfered with our closing to 5000
yards from the beach, where contact with any shipping
would be assured.
Tracked a patrol boat as he came down the coast to
seaward of us and then reversed course back toward MIKI
August 20 (-9)
Continued close in radar search for shipping. 156 and 256
megacycle radar was in evidence, but it didn't seem to
Dived on the fifty fathom curve two miles from the
beach where attack on any coastal traffic was assured.
Avoided a patrol boat coming down the coast.
August 21 (-9)
Sighted tops and smoke of a freighter coming out of
the mist from the north. As the enemy was inside the ten
fathom curve, we still had to close the coast a little and
dodge numerous sampans, but his escorts, two SC's, were
will clear on his beam and port bow to seaward. The
freighter was a modern, medium sized, engine-aft ship.
With range 900, 123 port track, speed 8, gyros around 30,
fired two Mk 23 torpedoes at his stack and foremast by
constant bearings, depth setting six feet. The first
torpedo evidently missed astern and exploded on the beach,
while the second torpedo left the tube with a clonk but
did not run. We had to take our first eight depth charges
at periscope depth, but had gained deep water for the next
Surfaced and headed around SHIONO MISAKI to attack
the constant traffic between this point and ICHIYE SAKI.
Radar on 82, 99, and 261 megacycles was in evidence but
nothing came of it.
August 21 (-9)
Dived in deep water off OKINOKURO SHIMA and closed
the beach slowly for an afternoon attack.
A large ship and two escorts proceeding eastward and
rounding SHIONO MISAKI out of reach changed our plan, and
we closed the next freighter two hours later. She was a
medium sized new engine-aft job with escorts well ahead,
but with a 3000 yard torpedo run, broke off the attack, as
a better shot was practically assured.
ATTACK NO. 5
After closing the beach to a twenty fathom spot off
OKINIKURO SHIMA, headed west too buck a two knot easterly
Sighted smoke, then a medium mast-funnel-mast
freighter coming up the coast unbelievably close to the
beach. Our approach consisted mainly of ducking two sub
chasers and whale killer escorts, and turning left for a
At a range of 1650 yards, fired three Mark 18-1
torpedoes spread 150 ft of the freighter's length by
constant bearings, 110 port track, depth setting six feet,
gyros around 20 left. All torpedoes exploded on the
We were at 200 feet, two fathoms off the bottom, when
the first depth charges let go, and reached deep water
twenty charges later. Our evasion at 100 turns kept
everything aft including late arriving pingers.
Checks on the firing bearings with our Mark 8, and
plot of the firing showed everything in order. This left
only the possibility of deep running torpedoes to explain
our persistent misses, so decided to keep slugging and
continue checking torpedoes.
On our first trip to MIKI SAKI we were caught napping
by a freighter and escort which rounded the point just
after dawn. Radar searches had shown no night traffic, so
felt sure shipping might wait at OWASE WAN just north of
MIKI and KUKI SAKI.
On surfacing, proceeded clear of KANTORI SAKI to
probe above the bay.
August 22 (-9)
ATTACK NO. 6
After passing MIKI SAKI, slowed, crossed the 100
fathom curve and proceeded around KUKI SAKI into OWASE
WAN. Side lobes were confusing, but we soon found a "pip
where no pip ought to be". The night was black and only
the long shape of the enemy could be seen until we circled
him to get him away from the land background. There he
was quite visible, identified as the gunboat who had
harassed us during our first visit, topping it off then
with those tooth-shakers. He tracked at zero speed and
was obviously anchored in about 20 fathoms two miles
northwest of KUKI SAKI. Holding our breath, we moved in
slowly to twelve hundred yards, twisted, then steadied for
a straight stern shot, and
fired one Mark 18-1 torpedo at his middle set on
three feet. The phosphorescent wake petered out after a
hundred yard run with the torpedo evidently headed down,
and hit bottom with a loud rumble, timed half way to the
enemy, where there should have been 250 feet of water. It
was tracked by sound to this moment, but after the rumble
cleared away, nothing more was heard.
Fired a second Mark 18-1 torpedo set on three feet,
feeling sure the enemy had been alerted by the first.
It's wake was dimly visible directly to the target,
tracked also by sound, but it passed underneath,
apparently running on the deep side too. With one salvo
of three left aft, circled for a
bow shot, and with range 900, fired a Mark 23 torpedo
from number 5 tube at his middle, set on zero feet.
Though we were stopped and absolutely steady and the gyro
angle zero, it took a thirty yard jog to the left before
settling towards the target and missed astern.
Still whispering, though the last two torpedoes must
have roared past him, fired a second Mark 23 torpedo from
number 6 tube set on zero aimed at his gun forward. It
took a jog to the left also, but settled down right for
his middle. The explosion forty seconds later was the
most spectacular we've ever seen, topped by a pillar of
fire and more explosions about five hundred feet in the
air. There was absolutely nothing left of the gunboat.
This vessel was observed at close hand previously
during daylight. She was new in appearance, flush deck,
with raised gun platforms forward and amidships mounting
estimated 3" double purpose guns. Aft of the midships
platform was a goalpost structure, possibly for use in
sweeping, topped by a lookout or director platform. Her
stern had very long almost horizontal depth charge racks
holding fourteen counted depth charges a side, and what
appeared to by Y-guns on the centerline. On observation
before firing she measured between 225' and 250' in length
and is estimated to have a standard displacement of 1500
Feeling that our difficulties had been mainly in
sluggish steering and depth engines, withdrew at full
power to spend the day checking afterbodies of our
After giving the steering engines a good workout to
insure they were free, checked our rudder throws. On
three of the six torpedoes they were three quarters to one
degree heavy. With a careful trim and no pressure in the
boat, swung all torpedoes and calibrated depth springs.
Now confident that our last two salvos would count,
headed for OKAI SAKI and the scene of our first attack of
August 23 (-9)
In position on the fifty fathom curve west of OMAI
SAKI, moved slowly to the bight of FUKUDA. We were six
thousand yard from the beach and it is certain that no
shipping passed, though navigational lights were burning.
Submerged, this time in our desired position, and
commenced a cautious periscope patrol. Plane activity
started right after daylight followed by the first patrol
a half hour later.
Sighted smoke of two freighters as they rounded OMAI
SAKI and commenced closing their track. As expected, they
were practically aground, so closed to 1000 yards from a
wreck off FUKUDA, undoubtedly one of our sub's handy-work.
Though the escorts were clear, an unexpected zip and a
third previously unobserved small freighter put us
underfoot. A full speed dash succeeded only in getting us
clear as they boiled by our bow and stern about two
hundred yards off.
We had been secured from battle stations less than a
half hour when an old type destroyer, four bombers, and a
float plane commenced searching down the coast. At first
it appeared that we'd been spotted, but his circling
tactics resembled the routine sweep we'd observed of MIKI
SAKI. Though we had our torpedoes set at two feet and he
came very close, we could secure nothing but sharp[ tracks
or large angle shots. Why his ear-splitting pinger didn't
pick us up will remain a pleasant mystery.
ATTACK NO. 7
With the destroyer just clear the reason for the
activity became apparent with the sighting of masts and
high superstructure of a ship coming down the coast toward
OMAI SAKI. He was escorted by a large PC or DE ahead, an
SC on his bow, our aircraft previously sighted overhead,
and an LST and a PC astern.
We had been forced out a little by the destroyer, and
a high speed approach was necessary to insure a short
firing range. It was therefore not until the angle on the
bow opened ten minutes before firing that the full import
of our enemy became apparent. The decks of his long
superstructure were lined with men in white uniforms, as
was his upper bridge.
Made another five minute dash to close the track,
took two echo ranges, and fired three Mark 23
torpedoes spread his length by constant bearings, 105
starboard track, range 800 yards, speed 8, depth setting
six feet, then commenced swinging for a stern shot at the
The first and third torpedoes hit beautifully in his
short well deck forward, and the after part of his long
superstructure, giving him a twenty degree down angle
which he maintained as he went under with naval ensign
There is no ship resembling this in any of the ONI
publications, though if the BUENOS AIRES MARU on page 45
were give a raked bow and her stack cut down level with
her superstructure, she would be a close approximation.
She was not, however, a hospital ship. The gross tonnage
of this vessel would be in the neighborhood of 10000 tons
and her standard displacement 15000.
Our LST headed for the beach and someone dropped two
depth charges, not close, which permitted us to get two
soundings and clear out at 100 turns. For once, depth
charging the submarine seemed to take second priority,
undoubtedly as survivors were picked up, for it was ten
minutes before they started to rain. We had then reached
deep water, and two hours at high speed, then gradual
slowing, kept everything astern, including a multi-ship
echo ranging search during the remainder of the day.
Following our hit and run policy, commenced a full
power dash to round SHIOKO MISAKI for another crack at the
coastal traffic before a waxing moon made evasion
August 24 (-9)
Radar on 82, 96, and 256 megacycles was again in
evidence near SHIONO MISAKI, but it appears to be poor, or
in part early warning installations.
Sighted a ship on the SJ at 10000 yards about on the
100 fathom curve. After tracking it at six knots and
gaining position ahead, picked up and sighted another ship
close to the beach. As this latter seemed to be the
larger and the
former probably an escort, switched approach and
dived for a periscope attack in the dawn that was
breaking. When the generated range was 3000 he commenced
signalling with yardarm blinkers, then turned away
displaying a super load of depth charges and efficient
looking guns. Though we had our tubes ready for this
patrol, he wandered shoreward, never giving us a setup.
It appeared that he had been relieved by a second patrol
which occupied our attention for the next two hours,
and too late we saw him lead a modern medium sized
diesel tanker out of KAZAMPO, just east of ICHIYE SAKI,
and head for SHIONO MISAKI hugging the coast.
Activity increased toward noon with the passage down
the coast of a HISKUN MARU class patrol with two stripes
on his stack. Within an hour sighted smoke beyond ATAKI
SAKI, and assuming our escort commander would soon be back
with the freighter, moved in to the forty fathom curve.
He was there all right on the next observation with two
large freighters astern. They were both riding high and
practically on the beach, escorted astern by a similar
patrol, on their beam by two worming destroyers, and five
PC's fanned our to the 100 fathom curve. Their echo
ranging frequencies varied from about 500 cycles, nicely
audible on the JP and sounding like a pile driver on the
lowest limit of the JK, to above the upper limit of the JK
at 37 KCS.
Convinced that this was a little too much for a
twenty fathom shot with our last three torpedoes,
slithered under the inboard PC, a fathom or two off the
bottom, and reached deep water with only one token depth
As our presence was at least suspected in this
location, commenced a high speed run around SHIONO
and KANTORIU SAKI to attack off NIGISHIMA SAKI after
daylight. This point lies about five miles southwest
of MIKI SAKI and is tipped by a small island three
hundred yards off the beach around which shipping
Our previous observations showed that the motorboat
patrols did not range this far from MIKI SAKI. If the
echo ranging patrols could be avoided below the gradients
in the fifty fathoms available without moving off their
track, position for attack would be assured.
Closing NIGISHIMA was not without incident however,
for with lookout and radar efficiency poor in
frequent rain squalls, suddenly sighted a submarine
on our beam parallel to us, unbelievably close at
1100 yards. Put him astern and moved out to five
thousand yards where tracking showed he had changed
away also. We then commenced an end around for dawn
observation and attack if enemy. Positive enemy
identification would have been impossible at night.
Shortly after we changed course for our end around
his pip at five thousand yards grew smaller and
disappeared apparently as he dived. After ranging
ahead on his original course, clear of his possible
submerged positions, and searching for an hour,
proceeded to NIGISHIMA SAKI.
As this is the same area in which four torpedoes
missed the TAUTOG, it will be interesting to know if any
friendly submarine was in this position thirty miles
southeast of KANTORI SAKI. His diving as soon as we
reversed course suggests radar, though no interference on
SJ or detector was noted.
August 25 (-9)
Dived three thousand yards from NIGISHIMA SAKI and
moved to within fifteen hundred yards of the beach.
Patrol activity started within a half hour, but
turned back short of us for some time, probably as a
continuous stream of cargo sampans was the only
escorting necessary. We did not remain at ease,
however, for on a return sweep down the coast, a PC
continued directly for us. We were two fathoms off
the bottom at 275 feet, rigged for silent running,
and depth charge too, when he passed directly
overhead. He gave no indication of suspecting our
presence, and we were able to come to periscope depth
as soon as he passed. Two repeat performances by the
PC, sweeps by a HISHUN MARU class patrol, and planes
on every observation, indicated coming shipping, by
they also prevented sufficient observations to fix
our position, and we were off ADASHIKA WAN,
a mile down the coast when smoke appeared around MINI
The tops, now visible, developed into a medium mast-
funnel-mast and a small engine-aft freighter. Guessing
they would continue across ADASHIKA WAN, swung left for a
stern shot with our last torpedoes. They turned into the
narrow bay however, giving us a 130 port track with a
range between 1500 and 2000 yards. Confident we could do
better, and influenced a little by an escort about to take
off our periscope, broke off the attack.
We had been back abreast of our island off NIMISHIMA
but an hour when more smoke came in sight. This
proved to be a patrol with a deep throated pinger
again sounding like a pile driver on the JP. The JP
was too realistic where the noise appeared to scrape
and klonk along the bottom. It was almost reassuring
when he shifted to short scale on passing
250 feet above us, and especially so when he
commenced driving piles again.
Attacks NOS. 8 & 9
During the next hour, two and then three patrols
the area, followed by distant high frequency echo
ranging from down the coast. though its peak was
above the range of our receivers, it grew steadily
louder until four escort vessels were in sight. The
coast was obscured by passing rain, but
soon the enemy ship came in sight very close to the
beach. She presented a starboard angle, so closed
the beach to get on her track before turning off for
a stern shot. Ont he next observation we were on her
port bow, so came to the
reverse of her course for low parallax firing.
The enemy was now identified as a modern medium sized
diesel tanker, heavily loaded. She was identical to the
vessel that slipped by us out of KAZAMPO on the previous
morning. Her quarter escort slipped astern as she came
on, three others remained fanned out on her starboard bow,
while the fifth ranged ahead. Our Navigator was correct
when he tabooed turning for a straight stern shot, for our
first echo range, inadvertently taken 180 degrees out,
showed 800 yards to the beach. The second, on the enemy,
checked with the periscope stadimeter at 600 yards, so
bearings, fired the first Mark 18-1 torpedo at his
stern, the second amidships, and the last a third
ship length ahead, right for the middle of the three
escorts nearly in line of bearing on his starboard
bow. Though the depth setting was six feet and the
gyros around 60 degrees, the first two hit exactly as
aimed and the third just blew hell out of the leading
escort. Though observed sparsely this latter is
believed to have been of the KUSKIRO MARU class with
standard displacement of 600 tons.
What was left of the tanker had now sunk and the
stern escort was making a run toward where his
quarter would have been. Expecting some close ones,
put him on our port bow and headed for deep water.
The initial barrages permitted high speed and single
ping soundings, and in fifteen minutes we reached
The enemy obviously never knew where the torpedoes
had come from, and though his search became systematic
with a total of sixty-eight depth charges, our 100 turn
evasion outflanked him.
With the moon hidden in clouds and the radar
detector coupled to the SD antenna giving only
strength two signals on 142, 242, and 306 megacycles,
surfaced and cleared the area at full speed. the
signal strength decreased rapidly as we withdrew, and
searchlights astern disappeared in gathering rain
August 26 (-9)
In overcast, scuddy weather, continued past AOGASHIMA
and set course for PEARL.
September 3 (+9 1/2)
(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
West of OMAI SAKI, a current counter to the Kursohio was
(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
In general all navigational lights were burning, but with
characteristics. In addition, observed fixed dimmed
lights which are visible less than three miles.
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
(H) ATTACK DATA
The possible defensive minefield between SHIONO MISAKI and
SAKI, noted in JICPOA information, is not considered to
(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
Speeds up to full under the initial depth charge barrages
soundings taken during explosions facilitated hugging the
and clearing the area to deep water. further evasion
100 turns for at least two hours invariable left all
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGES
It is considered that the design of the drum type
for trim pump, drain pump, turbo-blow, and
plant, is both poor and antiquated. The
of this controller approaches a major defect in
trim pump installation, where it will not stand up under
us and fails repeatedly.
This is essentially the same controller that was installed
USS ARGONAUT and improved in the WAHOO by addition of a
steel cover, which had to be left off to make the
repairs. It could well be classed with the Model T
and has the same characteristic crank and choke. Its
are not traceable to inexperienced operators, as it
as readily for old hands.
Its peak performance occurred on this patrol when its
put the trim pump out of commission while an enemy
screen pinged overhead. The silver soldering outfit for
is now kept handy by. The following list of
for this patrol alone should help to illustrate the
and need for replacement by a CUTLER-HAMMER type as
in EB boats:
August 7, 1944 Tripping out. Replaced
contacts and loosened metal cover.
August 9, 1944 Tripping out. Reversing
cover helped temporarily.
August 10, 1944 Carbon holder broke. Silver
holder and renewed carbons.
August 11, 1944 Zero ground. The top of the
coil was found caked with carbon dust.
August 14, 1944 Tripping out. Adjusted holding
August 17, 1944 Tripping out. Removed metal
August 19, 1944 Tripping out. Tightened loose
on drum contact and carbon holders.
August 21, 1944 Tripping out. Carbons were
be making only 10% contact.
August 22, 1944 Carbon holder broke. Silver
holder and renewed carbons.
August 26, 1944 Tripping out. Tightened shoes
adjusted carbon contacts.
SD - Not used
SJ - No interference was noted
It is believed that the transmitter failures of this
SJ radar continue to be excessive, compared to
similar units. It is serial number 11, probably
under pressure and not up to par. As suggested
by the Force Electronic Matériel Officer, this
should be replaced by another. The part failures
this patrol are listed below:
(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
Sound conditions were fair. Of interest is the wide
range of enemy pinging. It is considered quite
that many patrols previously considered to be
only, are actually echo ranging on frequencies
than can be covered by our receivers. A higher
receiver to determine this alone would be valuable.
(O) DENSITY LAYERS
Excellent layers were encountered south of HONSHU,
beginning between 100 and 150 feet.
(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
Number of men on board during patrol - - - - - - - - - 78
Number of men qualified at start of patrol - - - - - - 47
Number of men qualified at end of patrol - - - - - - - 65
Number of unqualified men making their first patrol- - 8
Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - - - - 15
(R) MILES STEAMED, FUEL USED
to area 2425 mi.
to Pearl 3325 mi.
enroute to area
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
60 days indefinite
(V) MARK EIGHTEEN TORPEDOES
The routine followed was similar to that of other boats
that it was not found necessary to interchange
between tube and racks.